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I.

INTRODUCTION

China’s remarkable economic growth in recent decades,
despite poorly defined property rights and a relatively weak legal
system, is a puzzle to the general literature of law, finance, and
development. China’s courts are rather weak and the judges are
1
not well trained. The number of attorneys practicing in China is
2
China also
relatively low compared to other jurisdictions.
performs far below other countries in terms of creditor rights,
3
shareholder protection, and corruption safeguards. These facts
present the quandary: How has China achieved such notable
† Xiabo Zhang is a Senior Research Fellow at the International Food Policy
Research Institute. The author would like to acknowledge the helpful comments
from Wei Chen, Shenggen Fan, and Xiaopeng Luo and research assistance from
Kiran Gajwani.
1. See Donald C. Clarke, Power and Politics in the Chinese Court System: The
Enforcement of Civil Judgments, 10 COLUM. J. ASIAN L. 1, 2, 10 (1996) (explaining that
there is a low execution rate for judicial cases and that court officials are poorly
educated).
2. Franklin Allen, Jun Qian & Meijun Qian, Law, Finance, and Economic
Growth in China, 9 (Wharton Financial Institutions Center, Working Paper No. 0244, 2002) (stating that there are 150,000 attorneys in China, which is roughly the
same number of licensed attorneys as in the state of California).
3. Rafael La Porta, Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes, Andrei Shleifer & Robert W.
Vishny, Law and Finance, 106 J. POL. ECON. 1113 (1998) (sampling various
countries to assess creditor rights, shareholder protections, and corruption).
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economic growth?
There is a broad consensus within economic literature that
institutions such as property rights are important to economic
4
growth. Economic scholars have studied the role and importance
5
of property rights in economic growth. Further, empirical studies
emphasize the importance of state institutions. Recent crosscountry data shows that the presence of a legal system matters to
6
economic growth and financial systems. Analysis arising out of this
data reveals that a common-law system consistently outperforms the
civil-law system in providing protection to minority shareholders,
7
thereby facilitating dispersed ownership and economic growth.
Property rights and the rule of law are some of the most important
aspects of good governance, and their countering effect on poverty
8
may even be stronger than the effects of democracy.
In developing and transitioning countries, a lack of welldefined property rights and formal legal systems is the norm rather
9
than the exception. When formal institutions are lacking, societies
may attempt to evolve along with their alternative systems to
10
protect their economic activities. Case studies show that social
arrangements can be as important as State institutions in their
11
ability to affect economic growth.
The economic impact of
societal arrangements is demonstrated by the rapid growth of the
township and village enterprises (TVE) in China during the 1980s
12
and 1990s.
Although the TVE does not have clearly defined
4. See, e.g., DOUGLASS C. NORTH, INSTITUTIONS, INSTITUTIONAL CHANGE AND
ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE (1990) (arguing that secure property rights are a
necessary condition for economic development).
5. See Janine Aron, Growth and Institutions: A Review of the Evidence, 15 WORLD
BANK RES. OBSERVER 99 (2000) (containing a general overview of the empirical
work completed on the importance of institutions to economic growth, as well as a
review of different ways to proxy for measures of institutional quality).
6. La Porta et al., supra note 3.
7. Id. at 1132.
8. David Dollar & Aart Kraay, Property Rights, Political Rights, and the
Development of Poor Countries in the Post-Colonial Period, ECONOMIC HISTORY
ASSOCIATION, 2000, http://www.j-bradford-delong.net/Logistics/eha_abstracts_fall
_2000.html.
9. See Marcel Fafchamps & Bart Minten, Property Rights in a Flea Market
Economy, 49 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 229 (2001) (utilizing Madagascar as a
case study to examine property rights).
10. See id. at 251 (discussing alternative contract enforcement methods where
formal institutions fail to offer protections).
11. IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY: ANALYTIC NARRATIVES ON ECONOMIC GROWTH
(Dani Rodrik ed., 2003) [hereinafter IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY].
12. YINGYI QIAN, How Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY,
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property rights, the sector has achieved remarkable growth.
The lack of formal property right protections in China causes a
14
high level of uncertainty associated with business engagements.
As a result, the transaction costs associated with writing a complete
contract are often prohibitive. But even ambiguous property rights
15
within the TVE can offer a certain level of economic security. In
fact, high transaction costs provide an environment where
ambiguous property rights can be more efficient than well-defined
property rights. In this context, ambiguous property rights in a
TVE may be a better option for business arrangements.
16
Local officials often act as shareholders of a TVE.
Thus,
business endeavors can secure protections from the local
government and reduce impediments to reform at the local level.
In the absence of an impartial third party to enforce contracts,
entrepreneurs may receive better protection by teaming up with
local officials as opposed to operating as purely private enterprises
that are forced to rely on China’s ill-functioning formal legal
17
system. China’s experience shows that growth can still take place
amidst less clearly defined property rights.
Various social
arrangements may provide necessary, alternative forms of
18
protection for property rights to underpin economic activities.

supra note 11, at 306; BEN CARVER ET AL., RENEWABLE LIGHTING FOR THE
DEVELOPING WORLD (2003), http://cee45q.stanford.edu/2003/briefing_book/
china.html#s4.1 (explaining that TVEs are defined as “rural, non-agricultural,
non-State enterprises that are collectively or privately owned” and are “analogous
to a corporation owned and managed by the local township or village”).
13. QIAN, supra note 12.
14. Id.
15. David D. Li, A Theory of Ambiguous Property Rights in Transition Economies:
The Case of the Chinese Non-State Sector, 23 J. COMP. ECON. 1, 15–16 (1996).
16. See Laixiang Sun, Fading Out of Local Government Ownership: Recent
Ownership Reform in China’s Township and Village Enterprises, 26 ECON. SYSTEMS 249
(2002) (explaining that local government ownership has dominated China’s
township and village enterprises).
17. Jiahua Che & Yingyi Qian, Insecure Property Rights and Government Ownership
of Firms, 113 Q. J. ECON. 467 (1998).
18. Although there is a large body of literature addressing how land tenure
arrangements affect agricultural investment and rural welfare in China, studies on
the impact of land property rights on industrial development are more limited.
For a discussion of land tenure arrangements see Hannan Jacoby, Guo Li & Scott
Rozelle, Hazards of Expropriation: Tenure Insecurity and Investment in Rural China, 92
AM. ECON. REV. 1420 (2002); James Kai-sing Kung, Choice of Land Tenure in China,
50 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 793, 795–98 (2002); Kalus Deininger &
Songqing Jin, Impact of Property Rights on Households, 51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL
CHANGE 851 (2003).
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But the ambiguous property rights offered by social
arrangements are not sufficient to explain why China has grown
faster than many other societies with better-defined property rights.
Apart from the property rights argument, there is a large body of
literature examining other sources for economic growth in China,
19
including market-preserving federalism, the release of high
20
quality human capital seeded in the planning era, the functioning
21
informal finance market, substantial total factor productivity
22
growth due to the high level of human capital, realigning of
23
comparative advantages in development strategy, increased input
24
25
use, and resource reallocation in the economic transition. As
economic growth ultimately results from the accumulation of many
factors, the above list is far from exhaustive.
The nature of China’s property rights arrangement has not
been sufficiently uncovered to explain its remarkable growth
patterns. This paper extends the list of factors affecting China’s
economic growth to include the diverging degrees of property
rights protections held by investors as opposed to individuals. This
consideration has largely been under-researched and is generally
not well understood by Western observers of China’s economy.
The next section reviews the regional property rights
26
27
hypothesis in China and explores the de jure and de facto
28
property rights that are present in China. Section III highlights
the divergence between investor property rights and individual
property rights, which contribute to an understanding of the

19. See, e.g., Yingyi Qian & Gerard Roland, Federalism and the Soft Budget
Constraint, 88 AM. ECON. REV. 1143 (1998) (discussing federalism in China’s
economic growth generally).
20. AMARTYA SEN, DEVELOPMENT AS FREEDOM 143, 143–45 (1999).
21. Allen et al., supra note 2, at 9.
22. See Gregory C. Chow & Kui-Wai Li, China’s Economic Growth: 1952–2010, 51
ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 247 (2002).
23. See Justin Yifu Lin, Development Strategy, Viability, and Economic Convergence,
51 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL CHANGE 277 (2003).
24. See Alwyn Young, Gold into Base Metals: Productivity Growth in the People’s
Republic of China During the Reform Period, 11 J. POL. ECON. 1220 (2003).
25. Shenggen Fan, Xiaobo Zhang & Sherman Robinson, Structural Change and
Economic Growth in China, 7 REV. DEV. ECON. 360 (2003).
26. De jure rights exist by right or according to law. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY
458 (8th ed. 2004).
27. De facto rights exist in fact and have effect even though they are not
formally or legally recognized. BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 448 (8th ed. 2004).
28. See infra Part II.
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29

nature of Chinese economic growth.
Section IV stresses the
30
Finally, Section V
negative consequence of this growth mode.
concludes with a discussion of the internal conflict between China’s
economic growth and the deprivation of individual property
31
rights.
II. REGIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
Historically, scholars have focused on the sovereign, national
32
level in assessing property rights. But in China, the protections
provided at the local level may matter more. China lacks clearly
defined, formal property rights and the accompanying legal system
33
required for their enforcement on the national level. Thus, the
country lacks a purely de jure property rights system.
The regional property hypothesis suggests that it is possible for
growth to take place under China’s current institutional
34
arrangements. This hypothesis underlines the importance of the
de facto property rights offered at the regional level and suggests
that they function as substitutes for weak, formal property rights.
De facto property rights partly satisfy investor demands by
35
providing adequate protections.
Investors benefit from the

29. See infra Part III.
30. See infra Part IV.
31. See infra Part V.
32. Robert H. Bates, On The Politics of Property Rights by Harber, Razo, and
Maurer, 42 J. ECON. LITERATURE 494, 497 (2004) (book review) (“In viewing
property rights, scholars have, along with Hobbes, referred to sovereigns; that is,
they have focused on the national level.”).
33. See supra Part I.
34. See Xiaobo Zhang & Kevin H. Zhang, How Does Globalization Affect Regional
Inequality Within a Developing Country? Evidence from China, 39 J. DEV. STUD. 47, 49–
51 (2003). Between 1978 and 1998, real gross domestic product grew 9.63% in
China. Id. at 50.
35. See Dani Rodrik, Getting Institutions Right, Apr. 2004, http://ksghome.har
vard.edu/~drodrik/ifo-institutions%20article%20_April%202004.pdf (explaining
that although China has no formal property protections, investors seemingly felt
more protected than in Russia, which does have formal property protections).
Rodrik articulates the view that legal institutions themselves do not really matter
for growth, rather it is the investors’ perceptions regarding the safety of their
property rights that really count. Id. He compares China’s “poor” legal property
rights to Russia’s “good” legal property rights, and finds that China has succeeded
in business growth while Russia has not. Id. at 7. Rodrik concludes that the
disparity is due to the success of China’s TVE and their sharing of profits with local
governments, which assures owners that the government will not take their land
away despite a lack of property rights. Id. at 8–9.
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36

implicit instrumental protections offered by local governments.
The order, stability, and predictability that local governments
provide are important ingredients to a de facto property rights
system. The hierarchical structure of China’s local governments
37
secures property rights at the local level. Fiscal decentralization
combined with mobile capital results in a hard budget constraint
for local governments and prevents them from bailing out failing
38
state-owned enterprises.
Under fiscal decentralization, local
governments are responsible for raising revenues to provide most
39
local public goods and services. Consequently, local governments
have an interest in promoting the growth of the TVE because it is a
40
major source of local revenues. In this regard, the interests of the
TVE and local governments are closely attuned to each other.
Although the ownership of a TVE is not standard, they work well in
an environment where formal protections of private property rights
41
are not in place.
Local governments also actively compete for foreign direct
42
investment (FDI). This competition leads local governments to
vigorously pursue the creation of a business-friendly investment
environment. Common practices include establishing special
zones, granting favorable tax breaks, and allowing free use of land
43
for a certain period of time.
With China’s opening up to the
global market, FDI has become one of the key drivers of economic

36.
37.

Id. at 7–9.
DAVID GRANICK, CHINESE STATE ENTERPRISES: A REGIONAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
ANALYSIS (1990). Others have traced secure regional property rights to interjudiciary competition. See Xiaopeng Luo, Regional Competition and Property Rights:
The Logic of Chinese Economic Reform, 2 MODERN CHINA RES. 1 (1995).
38. Qian & Roland, supra note 19, at 1144 (explaining that “competition
among local governments in attracting capital to their region creates an
externality which increases the opportunity cost of subsidizing inefficient
enterprises, which in turn reduces the incentives for bailouts”).
39. See World Bank Group, Decentralization and Subnational Regional Economics,
http://www.worldbank.org/publicsector/decentralization/fiscal.htm (explaining
that decentralized functions require local governments to raise adequate levels of
revenue).
40. BEN CARVER ET AL., supra note 12 (commenting that a primary objective of
the TVE is to increase local revenues).
41. Yingyi Qian, How Reform Worked in China, in IN SEARCH OF PROSPERITY,
supra note 11, at 297.
42. See Li, supra note 15, at 6 (stating that local officials are promoted to
higher ranks when the local economy excels).
43. See Symposium, The Role of Incentives in Foreign Direct Investment, 23 LOY.
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 605, 612–15 (2001).
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44

growth.
Even without a well-defined de jure property rights system,
China ranks the highest in terms of investor satisfaction with
regulatory interpretations and confidence in the judicial system as
45
shown in Table 1. Thus, preliminary evidence illustrates a chasm
between China’s potential for economic growth and the necessity
of a de jure property rights system. Yet the regional property
hypothesis is not sufficient to explain why the current system of de
facto property rights should perform better in China than the wellfunctioning de jure and de facto rights that exist in many other
countries. Functionally, the regional property rights hypothesis
explains the similarities between China’s de facto property rights
and the de jure property rights in other countries, showing that the
system in China could work. But the hypothesis does not explain
why China performs so well compared to many other countries that
have both a formal property rights system and a functioning legal
system. Certainly, there could be other reasons why China has
46
outperformed many other developing countries.
This paper
focuses on the question through the lens of property rights.
III. UNBALANCED INVESTOR AND INDIVIDUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS
An examination of the bargaining costs associated with formal
property rights and legal systems provides a basis for understanding
China’s strong economic growth. The procurement of land
through a formalized property rights system entails certain
47
negotiation and bargaining costs.
Large decisions like land
procurement go through a long procedure of negotiations,
44. See Zhang, supra note 34, at 49–51. Foreign direct investment generates
local revenues through taxes and fees. Foreign investment also provides “new
technology, managerial skill, and training for labor.” GREGORY C. CHOW, CHINA’S
ECONOMIC TRANSFORMATION 305 (2002).
45. World Bank Group, Investment Climate Survey Online (2005), http://
iresearch.worldbank.org/ics/jsp/index.jsp.
46. See supra Part I (listing a series of explanations for China’s economic
growth).
47. See NORTH, supra note 4. But see R. H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3
J.L. & ECON. 1, 15 (1960). R. H. Coase maintains that if property rights are well
defined and the parties can negotiate free of cost, then economic agents can
resolve conflicts through bargaining to achieve an efficient outcome. Id. But
efficient bargaining under Coase’s theory can be difficult to achieve in the
political economy domain due to a lack of commitment. See Daron Acemoglu,
Why Not a Political Coase Theorem? Social Conflict, Commitment, and Politics, 31 J. COMP.
ECON., 620, 622–23, 633–38 (2003).
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bargaining, and hearings involving relevant interest groups.
China’s informal, de facto property rights system allows the
government and investors to largely avoid these bargaining costs
and procedures, thereby promoting investments and economic
growth.
In democratic countries, it often takes years for different
49
interest groups to reach an agreement on land acquisition.
Interest groups provide a system of checks and balances for one
another. This prolonged negotiation process impedes the speed of
both public and private business investments. In this context,
democratic regimes can be rather rigid to reforms because certain
interest groups can effectively block and prolong any significant
changes, even when the changes may be good for the society as a
50
whole.
Thus, the functioning of well-defined property rights
entails significant negotiation costs.
In contrast, an authoritarian regime may have certain
advantages in prompting growth when its decisions are in line with
51
the public interest.
Under an authoritarian regime, it may be
easier to complete land transactions because of reduced efforts to
52
balance conflicting interests held by interest groups. As a result,
an authoritarian regime is likely to create a more business-friendly
investment environment.
The negotiation costs for land procurement in China are
much lower than in many other countries with well-defined
property rights. Lower negotiation costs arise from China’s unique
practice of recognizing varying degrees of property rights
48. See NORTH, supra note 4.
49. See PMC Land Acquisition Moves at Snail’s Pace, TIMES OF INDIA, Nov. 4, 2004
(discussing India’s administrative and governmental delays in land acquisition).
50. See MANCUR OLSON, THE RISE AND DECLINE OF NATIONS: ECONOMIC
GROWTH, STAGFLATION, AND ECONOMIC RIGIDITIES 57 (1982) (“After taking the time
needed to arrive at their own decisions, cartels and lobbies sometimes then need
more time to deal with their partners and antagonists . . . . The lobbying
organization must, besides agreeing on its own policies, go through the
compromises and procedures needed to change government policy. All this
makes decision-making still slower.”).
51. SEN, supra note 20, at 149. But when the authoritarian regime makes
mistakes, sometimes the consequences can be disastrous, like the Great Famine in
China. Id. at 150. Without enough checks and balances, the likelihood of making
unforgivable mistakes is higher than in democratic regimes. Id.
52. See Jennifer Windsor, Democracy and Development: The Evolution of U.S.
Foreign Assistance Policy, 27 FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 141 (2003) (suggesting the
argument that authoritarian regimes are better able to utilize scarce resources and
create economic growth).
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attributable to investors as opposed to individuals. China provides
effective protections for capital investments in many regions in
spite of the absence of well-defined, formal property rights and
53
legal systems. But the property rights of individuals, including
workers and farmers, are more loosely defined.
According to Article 10 of China’s 1982 Constitution, the State
owns the land in cities, while land in rural and suburban areas
belongs to the collectives—except the land which already has been
54
defined as State-owned.
In other words, Chinese law prohibits
55
private land ownership. Yet individuals are allowed to possess the
56
user rights, which are separated from the ownership right. These
long-term land user rights can be sold, rented, and used as
57
collateral. The contract term of land-use rights for housing can
last up to seventy years, and land-use rights for industrial, public,
58
and commercial purposes can last up to fifty years. Nominally, the
State cannot take the land away within the contract term except
under special circumstances when the land is reclassified for public
59
use.
There are at least three ambiguities in the law. First, the
definition of public interest is rather vague. For example,
universities in general are considered public although they charge
60
high tuition fees and operate like a commercial entity. In recent
53. See supra Part II. Although investors lack the formal protection of courts
and other legal systems to secure their property rights, some indigenous
institutional arrangements can provide functional and feasible substitutes. See John
C. Cofee, The Rise of Dispersed Ownership: The Roles of Law and the State in the
Separation of Ownership and Control, 111 YALE L.J. 1, 77 (2001) (“The point here is
not that law does not matter, but that partial functional substitutes for formal legal
requirements are both feasible and spreading.”).
54. XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.).
55. Down on the Farm: A Rural Crisis Is Forcing Beijing to Reconsider the Idea of
Private Property, NEWSWEEK INT’L, May 15, 2006 (acknowledging that China “still
lacks private-property rights” and that “Chinese cannot legally own land”).
56. See XIAN FA art. 10 (1982) (P.R.C.) (amended 1988) (“[N]o organization
or individual may appropriate, buy, sell or otherwise engage in the transfer of land
by unlawful means. The right to the use of land may be transferred according to
law.”).
57. Benjamin Robertson, China: Selling Out the Family Farm, FAR E. ECON. REV.,
Oct. 26, 2005, at 48–51.
58. Stephen Wong, Chinese Fear Homes Are Castles in the Air, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
Oct. 3, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HJ03Cb01.html.
59. See T. Oliver Yee, A Bid For a New Future: What Are the Effects and Challenges
of the New National Public Bidding Regulations on Land Use Rights Assignment in
China?, 4 WASH. U. GLOBAL STUD. L. REV. 447, 448–49 (2005).
60. The Langfang Dongfang University town presents an example of how
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land is initially procured under the guise of “public use,” but quickly transforms
into a commercial enterprise. Langfang City belongs to Hebei Province, but is
located right between Beijing and Tianjin, the two largest cities in northern China.
Langfang, CHINA DAILY, July 16, 2004, http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/
doc/2004-07/16/content_349131.htm. In order to take advantage of its
geographical location, and in response to a campaign to turn high education into
an industry, the Langfang Economic Development Zone decided to build the
largest university town in China. Cf. Shi Jiangtao, Cadres Disciplined Over University
Land Scam, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Dec. 31, 2004, at 12 (explaining that
Langfang became one of fifty-four cities to develop universities in response to the
central government’s education expansion plan). With the nationwide zeal of
turning universities into enterprises, Langfang City expected to use the land as a
bait to attract investors to build in the town. See Pamela Pun, University Housing
Scam Exposed, STANDARD (China), at A01, translated in WISENEWS, available at
http://www.hkbu.edu.hk/~cstafrep/wnews/wisenews040527.html. Cf., Jiangtao
(stating that many university plans “turned out to be commercial property
developments”).
As a signature project, the university-town project easily obtained a permit
acquiring 5,728 mu of farmland for public use. See Big Problems with Some Chinese
College Cities, Official, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (China), July 1, 2004, http://english.
peopledaily.com.cn/200407/01/eng20040701_148143.html (stating that arable
land was obtained through illegally signed land contracts). The university town
paid farmers 55,000 yuan per mu in accord with the official price of land for
public use. See Illegal Land Acquisition in Dongfang University Town, PEOPLE (China),
Feb. 17, 2004, http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2342990.html. But
the market value of the land was eventually estimated at 300,000 yuan per mu. Id.
The land was inevitably used for commercial purposes, building commercial
apartment buildings, villas, stores, and golf courses. See Jiangtao; see also A
Disturbingly Luxurious Golf Course, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http://www.people.com.
cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2347970.html.
The university town did not need to contribute much money in advance.
Yang Bo & Du Zhen, The Alarming Debt Black Hole, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2340954.html. The bidding construction
companies were required to self-finance for the first three years before receiving a
payment by the fourth year. Id. But the actual enrollment turned out to be far
lower than expected. See Chan Siu-sin, University Town Gets Blasted by Auditor:
Developments Bypassed State Council Land-Use Approval and Abused Credit, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, June 2, 2005, at 4 (stating that loans may not be repaid because
student enrollment remained lower than expected). By the end of 2003, the
university town had to default on its payments to the construction companies, who
in turn defaulted on their loans to the banks and put workers’ wages in arrears.
Yang Bo & Du Zhen, The Alarming Debt Black Hole, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http://
www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2340954.html. The crisis was not exposed
to the media until one of the contractors took sleeping pills in an attempt to
commit suicide in front of the university town managers and city leaders in protest
of the overdue payments. See Su Wei, No Way to Get Paid: University City in Langfang
Stuck in Deficit, BEIJING TODAY, Apr. 2, 2002, http://bjtoday.ynet.com/article.jsp?
oid=2949742&pageno=1. His life was saved and his brave behavior helped his
workers get some of their wages in arrear. Id. For additional insight into the
Langfang Dongfang University see Shockingly Illegal Land Acquisitions, PEOPLE
(China), 2004 http://www.people.com.cn/GB/jiaoyu/1054/2342990.html; The
Secrets of Instantly Gaining Wealth, PEOPLE (China), 2004, http://www.people.com.
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61

years, many universities have expanded their campuses.
By
labeling the land in the interest of the public, the universities can
obtain land-use permits, which allow them to acquire land from
62
farmers at a much lower price than for commercial purposes.
Second, the law does not specify, in detail, how to compensate
those being deprived of land. It loosely states that developers
should grant a certain amount of compensation based on the years
of actual use by the farmers in the land and the land development
63
situation.
Third, the law does not stipulate a relationship between
collectives and peasants for rural land. In rural areas, collectives
refer to villages where a village committee normally exercises
64
executive power.
Therefore, in reality, local governments only
need to deal with the village committee during the land
procurement process. In bypassing farmers, the local governments
and developers can significantly reduce the negotiation cost.
Sometimes, they collude to extract as much rent as possible from
65
farmers’ land. To a large extent, farmers do not have much voice
66
in the land procurement process. They are rarely informed of the
purpose of land procurement or the terms of compensation until
67
the arrangements are finalized and officially announced.
Moreover, individuals usually must vacate their house or property
cn/GB/jiaoyu /1054/2345093.html.
61. See id.
62. See id.
63. See XIAN FA art. 13 (1982) (P.R.C.) (amended 2004) (“The State may, in
the public interest and in accordance with law, expropriate or requisition private
property for its use and shall make compensation for the private property
expropriated or requisitioned.”).
64. See Farmers to Choose New Villagers’ Committees, CHINA DAILY, Mar. 21, 2005
(explaining that a villagers’ committee is a governmental organization that
manages the village’s affairs).
65. See Xiaokai Yang, Theories of Property Rights and China’s Reforms, 4 CHINA
ECON. REV. 195, 207 (1993) (stating that local governments attempt to assist
investment firms). This agency-like relationship can be seen as a “positive
development because the local governments are strongly geared to assist
development of local firms instead of making troubles for them. On the other
hand, of course, this generates rampant corruption.” Id.
66. Mark Magnier, Land Grabs Pit Farmers Against Developers, L.A. TIMES, Apr.
19, 2006 (expressing farmers’ resentment over the lack of hearings and
opportunities to negotiate fair land prices and further describing their protests
against land grabs).
67. See Farmland in Capital Illegally Cleared for Golf Course, S. CHINA MORNING
POST, July 9, 2000, at 9 (explaining that farmers were not consulted before a
tourism board signed an agreement renting their land for use as a golf course).
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on the land under a short notice, otherwise the state can use force
68
to demolish the property by exercising the power of law.
The ambiguities inherent in China’s current laws allows
developers and local governments to acquire a land-use permit for
developments in the public interest but then develop some of the
land for commercial purposes. This creates a strong incentive for
local governments to grab land. This is why there has been a
nationwide “development zone fever” and “real estate fever” since
Xiaoping Deng called for more “openness” during his famous tour
69
in the South in 1992. The current political environment allows
these so-called development zones to easily be labeled as in the
public interest.
Strong regional protection for investors’ rights together with a
weak protection of individual rights lowers the cost of doing
business. In turn, the process of land procurement is eased and
local governments economically prosper. Land is an important
70
source of local revenues. With increasing industrialization and
71
urbanization, the demand for land drives up land values.
Although severe competition for mobile capital restrains local
governments from over-taxing the industrial sector, land values
nonetheless create a source of income for local governments. The
more development there is in a region, the higher land price
becomes and the more local governments come to rely on land for
local revenues. Naturally, land becomes a target of revenue for
72
local governments. Figure 1 reveals a clear positive correlation

68. See Eviction Was Belated for Project in China, SEATTLE TIMES (Wash.), June 9,
2006, at A2 (commenting on a building commission’s eviction and demolition
orders).
69. John Gittings, Phoney Deals of 'Development Fever' Take Toll, GUARDIAN
(London), June 23, 1998, at 20; New Rules Aim to Cool Development Zone Fever, CHINA
DAILY, June 12, 1995, at 1; Kent Chen, Development Zones ‘Wasteful,’ S. CHINA
MORNING POST, March 30, 1993; Taiwan Paper Publishes ‘Gist’ of Deng Xiaoping’s
Classified Speech on Reform, BRITISH BROADCASTING CORP., March 11, 1992.
70. See Chengri Ding, Effects of Land Acquisition on China’s Economic Future,
LAND LINES (Lincoln Inst. of Land Pol’y, Cambridge, MA), Jan. 2004,
http://www.lincolninst.edu/pubs/PubDetail.aspx?pubid=872 (stating that a local
government’s revenue-raising capability is rooted in China’s land ownership
structure).
71. See Xiaobo Zhang, Timothy D. Mount & Richard N. Boisvert,
Industrialization, Urbanization, and Land Use in China, (Int’l Food Policy Research
Inst., Environment and Prod. Tech. Div., Discussion Paper No. 58, 2000)
(explaining that industrialization and urbanization increase land scarcity).
72. See Ding, supra note 70.
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73

between land revenues and economic development. In addition
to being a revenue source, local governments also use land as an
instrument to acquire loans to finance infrastructure
74
development.
Once land is acquired, local governments and
developers can then use the State-owned land as collateral to
75
directly seek credit from State banks.
The inequitable distribution of security between investor and
individual property rights represents a unique feature of China’s
property-rights system. On the one hand, local governments
provide strong protection for business investment, particularly in
76
regions with a large FDI presence.
The highly conducive
investment climate and strong de facto property rights help to
77
explain how China has managed to grow so fast.
Table 2
compares China with its peers and provides strong evidence of an
78
exceptionally conducive investment climate in China.
On the
other hand, local governments take advantage of the loopholes in
the law to seize land from farmers without sufficient
73. CHINA STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, CHINA COUNTY PUBLIC FINANCE
STATISTICAL YEARBOOK (2001).
74. WORLD BANK, CHINA: LAND POLICY REFORM FOR SUSTAINABLE ECONOMIC AND
SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT (2005).
75. Swati Lodh Kundu, Rural China: Too Little, Too Late, ASIA TIMES ONLINE,
July 19, 2006, http://www.atimes.com/atimes/China_Business/HG19Cb01.html
(explaining that the State uses requisitioned land as collateral for bank loans).
76. See supra Part II.
77. In the past, China and India had similar levels of economic growth. See S.
Venkitaramanan, Two Emerging Giants: The Global Debate, BUS. LINE (Hindu), May 9,
2005 (“In the 1970s when the two countries started growing, their gross domestic
product per head at common international prices were broadly similar.”). But
China’s economic growth in recent years has far exceeded India’s own economic
growth. Kevin Rafferty, India Fails to Realize its Democratic Advantage, GULF NEWS,
Sept. 23, 2003. Subsidies in India vividly illustrate how a country with formal
institutions can be hampered by its own internal policies. ASHOK GULATI & SUDHA
NARAYANAN, SUBSIDY SYNDROME IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE 90 (2003). Electricity is
free or subsidized. Id. Consequently, farmers tend to over-consume the
electricity, thereby contributing to an overstressed power system and frequent
power outages in many rural areas. Id. at 90–91. Although politicians are fully
aware of the problem, few dare to propose a change in policy for fear of losing the
popular support of farmers. Id. at 122–36. Power outages take a toll on the
growth of India’s economy. David Dollar, Mary Hallward-Driemeier & Taye
Mengistae, Investment Climate and Firm Performance, 54 ECON. DEV. & CULTURAL
CHANGE 1 (2005); India’s Electricity Reforms: Underpowering, ECONOMIST, Sept. 24,
2005, at 83–84. The problem of inadequate infrastructure more than offsets
India’s advantage in having a well-defined property rights system. Id.
78. World Bank Group, Doing Business: Comparing Business Regulations, 2006,
http://www.doingbusiness.org (providing insight into the investment climates of
China, India, Indonesia, and the Philippines).
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79

IV. LAND RIGHTS: FUEL OF GROWTH AND VOLCANO OF SOCIAL
CONFLICT
Easy access to land facilitates capital investment, which in turn
prompts industrial growth. About one-fourth of China’s dramatic
economic growth in recent decades stems from capital
80
accumulation. Table 3 shows that the growth rate of fixed asset
investment in China is over five percent higher than the growth
rate of per capita consumption, indicating that the pace of fixedasset investment significantly exceeded the rate of per capita
81
consumption.
Fierce regional competition encourages local governments to
seek credit to develop their local economy. Before 1994, it was
common practice for local governments to force banks in their
jurisdiction to extend them credit, creating serious inflation in the
82
early 1990s.
Since 1994, however, the central government has
79. Jim Yardley, The Great Divide: Suddenly Landless Farmers Being Moved Aside By
China’s Real Estate Boom, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1. Weak individual rights
also apply to workers. For example, migratory workers do not have access to
education, healthcare, and jobs. Sarah Carr, Millions of Migrant Workers Moved to
Chinese Cities Seeking Opportunity, but Their Children Are Falling Through the Cracks of
the Education System, MILWAUKEE J. SENTINEL (Wis.), Jan. 4, 2007, at A1. With cheap
labor and land, generous tax breaks, good infrastructure, and a predictable
investment environment, it is not surprising that China attracts considerable
foreign direct investment.
80. Shenggen Fan, Xiaobo Zhang & Sherman Robinson, Structural Change and
Economic Growth in China, 7 REV. DEV. ECON. 360, 374 (2003).
81. Per capita consumption and fixed asset investment data is from the China
Statistical Yearbook.
CHINA STATE STATISTICAL BUREAU, CHINA STATISTICAL
YEARBOOK (2004). See also Xiaobo Zhang & Kong-Yam Tan, Blunt to Sharpened
Razor: Incremental Reform and Distortions in the Product and Capital Markets in China,
(Int’l Food Policy Research Inst., Dev. Strategy and Governance Div., Discussion
Paper No. 13, 2004) (discussing, in detail, the causes of discrepancy between
consumption and investment data in GDP statistics). Jinstin Yifu Lin attributes
China’s deflation from 1998 to 2002 to excessive production capacity, which was
caused by the overwhelming expansion of fixed asset investment in relation to
income growth. Jinstin Yifu Lin, Is China’s Growth Real and Sustainable?, 12 (China
Center for Economic Research, Peking University, Working Paper No. E2004003,
2004). Lin, however, does not offer any further explanation as to why the growth
of fixed asset investments surpasses consumption by so much.
82. See Ya-Hwei, Development and Financial Problems in China’s Financial System,
2004, http://www.tsc.nccu.edu.tw/2004conference/%B7%A8%B6%AE%B4f.pdf
(stating that China’s financial system “has been under full government control
[for many years], where the government alone decided which direction private
funds should go” and that since 1988, the economy has suffered from inflation
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reasserted its control over the banks and has separated bank
83
But despite an initial slowbranches from local governments.
84
down, the growth rate of fixed-asset investment has accelerated.
Theoretically, if the monetary authority is centralized, fiscal
85
decentralization should not lead to credit expansion. But why
then did fixed-asset investment increase rather than slow down in
China after the separation of bank branches from local
governments in 1994? The answer is related to land banking.
The ambiguous law on land use gave local governments leeway
in obtaining land-use permits within their locality. Having received
a land-use permit, local governments can easily procure land from
farmers at a low price and turn the ownership from collectives over
86
to the State. Local governments could continue obtaining credit
from State banks even after bank branches were separated from
87
local governments in 1994.
Nominally centralized monetary
88
systems still have loopholes. Functionally speaking, the monetary
system is not independent from the land grabs of local
governments. This theory helps explain why the current interest
rate policy is not sufficient to cool down the demand for fixed asset
investment.
Despite the benefits of growth, the current land fever also has
negative consequences. Nearly thirty-four million mu of farmland
were converted to urban and industrial development from 1987 to
89
2001, and about thirty-four million farmers lost land.
The
Ministry of Land and Resources reported that “China’s cultivated
land is dwindling owing to construction recently, leading to a
90
serious contradiction between land and population.”
The
due to overheating).
83. Id. (explaining that in 1994, the government established “national policy
banks to be in charge of policy-oriented financial business”).
84. China’s Economy Slows but Still Grows 8.5 Percent, PAC. SHIPPER, Apr. 20,
2006.
85. See Qian & Roland, supra note 19.
86. The Langfang University Town experience provides a vivid example on
the mechanism of land grabs. See supra note 60.
87. See Ya-Hwei, supra note 82 (commenting that local governments still enjoy
wide discretion in administrative decisions).
88. The arguments here do not invalidate the insights of Yingyi Qian and
Gerard Roland on the role of an independent monetary system.
89. Han Jun, Jiang Tudi Nongmin Jiti Suyou Dingjie Wei An Gufen Gongyouzhi
[Change Collective Land Ownership into Shareholder Ownership], Zhongguo Jingji
Shibao [CHINA ECON. TIMES], Nov. 11, 2003 [hereinafter Change Collective Land
Ownership]. One mu is equivalent to one-sixth of an acre. Yardley, supra note 79.
90. Ministry of Land and Resources, Some Facts About the Land and Resources of
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compensation received by farmers accounts for only a fraction of
91
the total market value. Clearly, local governments and developers
appropriate a large fraction of the land rent.
Aside from paying low compensation for land acquisitions,
local governments and developers often provoke additional
outrage by using the land for commercial purposes in violation of
92
the original public purpose intent.
When facing unfair
compensation and broken promises, individuals can, in principle,
file a lawsuit with the courts. But the local courts rarely take cases
93
pertaining to local government. As a result, aggrieved individuals
often end up having to appeal to the county-level government,
provincial party leadership, central government, the media, or
whoever else will listen to them. This may be why the Ministry of
Construction received three times as many complaints about land
disputes in the first quarter of 2004 as in the same period during
94
2003.
According to their statistics, by the end of June, 4,000
groups and 18,600 individuals had lodged petitions over allegedly
95
illicit land confiscations.
Another recent study also shows that
land disputes top the list of farmer petitions, accounting for
96
approximately sixty-three percent of total complaint letters.
A dramatic increase in the number of media reports on
corruption within the banking and real estate sectors also

China, 2007, http://www.mlr.gov.cn/pub/gtzyb/mlrenglish/facts/index.htm.
91. Change Collective Land Ownership, supra note 89; see also Yardley, supra note
76 (explaining that local officials offered farmers sixty dollars per mu for Xisha
land and then leased the same land to developers for fifty times that amount).
92. During land grabs, tension rises to the point of riots and protests between
farmers and local governments. See Yardley, supra note 79 (“Riots and protests
over land seizures and inadequate compensation have erupted across China for
much of this year.”).
93. See Housing Disparity Highlights Need for Even Playing Field, S. CHINA
MORNING POST, Apr. 3, 2006, at 2 (discussing social land conflicts, stating that the
resolution to such conflicts in China will be “brutal” because “[i]n other countries,
independent courts and a democratic process provide avenues to resolve conflicts,
but these are missing in China”).
94. See Li Jing, Freeze Extended on Demolishing Firms, CHINA DAILY, July 12, 2004,
at 3 (“The complaints related to demolished homes filed at the Ministry of
Construction in the first half of [2004] are more than those in all of 2003. . . . In
the first quarter of this year, the number of complaints tripled the number in the
same period last year.”).
95. Edward Cody, China’s Land Grabs Raise Specter of Popular Unrest, WASH.
POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at A1.
96. Jianrong Yu, How Peasants Lose Their Land Ownership?, 2003,
http://www.ccrs.org.cn.
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97

highlights the seriousness of nationwide rent seeking.
With
globalization, it is much easier to move capital across borders. This
creates an opportunity for corrupted officials to hide their rents
overseas, making it harder to fight corruption in the financial and
land sectors.
Exchanges involving an asymmetric relationship between
98
parties usually bring about negative externalities. In China’s case,
land grabbing is likely to plant the seeds of hatred, which may be a
vehicle for future social unrest. The clashes between local
governments and farmers over land grabs may veer into violence
and riots, particularly when coupled with other political and
economic shocks.
In the short run, the weak protection of individual property
rights may fuel economic growth because it reduces the transaction
costs of acquiring land, a must for business investment. But in the
long run, it may cause profoundly negative consequences. On the
economic front, the land-grabbing fever may result in excess
99
production capacity and deflation. On the political side, it creates
new powerful political interest groups, which make future reforms
more difficult. Peasants deprived of their land often do not have a
viable alternative livelihood and are therefore more likely to
100
organize and fight with the authorities. This increasing potential
97. Some of the recent reports on rent-seeking activities in the banking and
real estate sectors include illegal land grabs by local governments in Shaanxi and
the Fujiang and Guangdong Provinces. See Edward Cody, China’s Land Grabs Raise
Specter of Popular Unrest, WASH. POST, Oct. 5, 2004, at A1 (Fujiang and Guangdong
Provinces); Jim Yardley, Farmers Being Moved Aside by China’s Real Estate Boom, N.Y.
TIMES, Dec. 8, 2004, at A1 (Shaanxi). Yang Xiuzhu, vice chief of the construction
department of Zhejiang Province, extracted bribes from property developers and
disappeared. Peter S. Goodman, From Rags to Riches to Arrests in Booming China,
WASH. POST, Dec. 5, 2003, at E1. Chen Kai, a local government official of Fuzhou,
Fujian Province, borrowed an estimated fifty million dollars from six state banks
and provided kickbacks of around five percent of the loans to the lending officers.
John Pomfret, Chinese Officials Held in Regional Corruption Probe, WASH. POST, Dec.
17, 2003, at A39. Shanghai real estate tycoon, Zhou Zhengyi, was implicated in an
array of illegal loans coupled with default on statutory compensations for
relocatees whose homes were improperly demolished for redevelopment projects.
See Miao Ye, Investing in Misery, ASIA TIMES ONLINE, Dec. 18, 2003, http://www.
atimes.com/atimes/China/EL18Ad02.html.
98. Ravi Kanbur, On Obnoxious Markets, in GLOBALIZATION, CULTURE, AND THE
LIMITS OF THE MARKET: ESSAYS IN ECONOMICS AND PHILOSOPHY 39 (2004); see also
Housing Disparity Highlights Need for Even Playing Field, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Apr.
3, 2006, at 2.
99. Lin, supra note 81.
100. See William Barnes, Farmers Threaten Land Grab, S. CHINA MORNING POST,
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for conflict may jeopardize social stability, which has been a major
asset for China’s favorable investment environment.
V. CONCLUSION
The intent of this article was to examine why outside
investment and growth in China have been so strong, despite the
existence of a relatively weak de jure property rights system for
investors. As a country in transition, China faces many institutional
constraints including less-defined property rights. Decentralization
and globalization have created strong regional competition for
private capital in China, leading local governments to protect the
property of private investors.
Local governments are forced by the market to offer de facto
protections for investors’ property. In order to raise revenue and
provide land to investors, local governments have taken advantage
of weaknesses in the existing land laws that allow local governments
101
to procure land from private individuals for public purposes.
Land is being taken at a fraction of its market value for supposed
public purposes, and then being provided to private investors to
102
promote local economic growth. Local governments also provide
103
These protections serve as a
favorable tax breaks to investors.
substitute for the weak formal property rights and legal systems that
prevail in China, and have helped to fuel rapid economic growth.
But this behavior imposes a high cost on those individuals who
lose their land and associated livelihoods. Forty million farmers
104
have already lost land to takings by local governments. The legal
system seems unable to resolve land-taking conflicts when they
arise, and affected farmers are increasingly organizing to protest
105
and petition for change.
Two possible outcomes seem likely.

Jan. 27, 1999, at 10 (discussing the possibility that farmers may attempt to seize
national forest land in response to their joblessness, despite opposition from the
government).
101. See supra Part III.
102. Id.
103. See Anthony Harrington, Tax Breaks Aiding Inward Investment, SCOTSMAN
(Scotland), Nov. 21, 2006, at 7 (“[T]he Chinese government has not been shy
about using tax incentives to try to direct inward capital flows.”).
104. Jim Yardley, Premier Says China Beset by Corruption and Rural Land Issues,
Mar. 14, 2006, at A5 (“Government studies show that at least 40 million farmers
have been left landless in recent years, often because of illegal seizures by local
officials who exploit the current policy.”).
105. Housing Disparity Highlights Need for Even Playing Field, supra note 93.
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The central government could enact additional political reforms to
grant farmers more secure property rights and to hold local
governments more accountable for their actions. Or, more farmers
will join the army of the landless and a time may come when a
volcano of hatred toward governments and developers will erupt,
provoking unmanageable riots and social unrest.
Social conflict could prove disastrous for China’s continued
economic growth. On the positive side, social unrest may also serve
as a pressure point for political reform. In the long run, as a
country gets rich, people tend to demand more secure protections
for individual property rights. Whether China can sustain its
economic growth depends upon its ability to respond to emerging
conflicts with continuing institutional innovations. The key is for
the government to be adaptive enough to navigate the bumpy road
ahead.
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TABLE 1. FIRM RESPONSES REGARDING CHINA’S REGULATIONS AND
JUDICIARY

Brazil
China
India
Indonesia
Philippines

Consistency of
officials’ interpretation
of regulations
34.0
66.3
35.9
44.0
50.9

Confidence in
the judiciary
system
60.4
82.5
70.6
59.2
66.2

The first column of data represents the percentage of firms that
agreed with the statement: “In general, government officials’
interpretations of regulations affecting my establishment are
consistent and predictable.” The second column of data represents
the percentage of firms that agree with the statement: “I am
confident that the judicial system will enforce my contractual and
106
property rights in business disputes.”

106.

See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
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107

Getting
credit

Registering
property

Starting
up

TABLE 2. BUSINESS INDICATORS FOR SELECT COUNTRIES

107.

Brazil

China

India

Indonesia

Philippines

Number of
procedures

17

12

11

12

11

Duration
(days)

152

41

89

151

50

Registering
property number of
procedures

14

3

6

6

8

Registering
property time (days)

42

32

67

33

33

Cost to
create
collateral
(% of
income
per capita)

21.4

0

11.3

2.5

8.3

See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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TABLE 3. PER CAPITA CONSUMPTION AND FIXED-ASSET INVESTMENT
Per capita
consumption
(yuan)
437
485
550
693
762
803
896
1,070
1,331
1,746
2,236
2,641
2,834
2,972
3,138
3,397
3,609
3,818
4,089

Year
1985
1986
1987
1988
1989
1990
1991
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
2002
2003
Annual
growth rate (%)

108.

13.23

108

Fixed-asset
investment
(billion yuan)
254
312
379
475
441
452
559
808
1,307
1,704
2,002
2,291
2,494
2,841
2,985
3,292
3,721
4,350
5,557

18.70

See supra note 81 and accompanying text.
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FIGURE 1. ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND LAND REVENUE IN CHINA

6

8
10
Economic development level

12

Figure 1 depicts the relationship between revenues from land and
economic development at the county level in 2000. The horizontal
axis represents per capita gross output value of agriculture and
industry. The vertical axis indicates the per capita revenue
collected from land use. Both variables are in the logarithmic
109
form.

109.

See supra note 73 and accompanying text.
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